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Abstract
This paper develops a model of pricing dynamics in business to business relationships. The
formation of business relationships is a process of search and matching between retailers and
wholesalers in the product market. The size of each transaction and the related price are
set through bilateral bargaining. There are three key factors that inuence the reaction of
prices and quantities to cost shocks: the persistence of the shocks, the adjustment of nal
goods production and the search externalities. These factors determine how rms adjust,
whether through the intensive margin, through the extensive margin or through both. Based
on this, we assess to what extent wholesale prices a¤ect the allocation of consumption in
closed economy and deliver expenditure switching in open economy.
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1 Introduction
Empirical studies document that marginal cost shocks are not fully passed through to prices at
the rm level and that prices are substantially less volatile than costs.1 This is in stark contrast
with the monopolistic competition framework usually embedded in macroeconomic models, the
one developed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), which implies a complete pass-through of costs to
prices. Various theories have been proposed to justify the evidence that prices are more stable
than costs. For example, recent literature has attributed the low degree of pass-through of
exchange rate shocks to prices to either local distribution costs, markup adjustments (due, for
instance, to a variable elasticity of demand) or pure nominal rigidities (menu costs).2
In this paper we study to what extent product market frictions, bargaining and search
externalities can explain real price rigidity. Our analysis is based on two key assumptions.
First, both retail rms and wholesale producers spend resources to engage in new long-term
business relationships. Second, once a business relationship is formed, both the wholesale price
and the quantity of the good exchanged are bargained between wholesalers and retailers.
There is a vast empirical evidence on the importance of business to business (B2B) long-
term relationships and product market imperfections. For example, Blinder et al. (1998) nd
that 85 percent of the U.S. rms surveyed engage mightily in long-term relationships with their
customers and that 77 percent of their customers are other rms. These long-term relationships
are mainly governed by contracts, and these contracts typically last for one year.3 As noted by
Matha and Pierrard (2011), rms allocate a non-negligible amount of resources in the search
for customers or suppliers. In 2006, advertising, marketing and promotion activities in the U.S.
amounted to around 600,000 jobs, that is, to almost 0.5 percent of total U.S. employment. A
similar amount of people were engaged in purchasing and buying occupations. Moreover, annual
expenditures in all media advertising averaged 2.5 percent of U.S. GDP over the last decade.
Empirically, price negotiations between rms seem to be the rule rather than the exception.
1See, for instance, Hellerstein (2008), for the beer industry, Nakamura and Zerom (2010), for the co¤ee industry,
Goldberg (1995), for the automobile industry, and Kadiyali (1997), for the photographic industry.
2 It is also possible that the way the demand elasticity inuences the pass-through to prices is a function of
the performance of the rm. For example, studying a rm-level dataset of French exporters, Berman, Martin
and Mayer (2012) nd that the degree of pass-through of exchange rate shocks to export prices depends on the
productivity and size of the exporter.
3These ndings are corroborated by other studies. See, for instance, Apel et al., 2005 for the case of Sweden.
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Zbaracky et al. (2004) nd that customer communications and price negotiation costs account
for almost 75 percent of the total price adjustment costs and are 20 times as large as the menu
costs. According to Fabiani et al. (2006), the rms surveyed by nine Central Banks of the
Euro Area report that price rigidity arises mainly as the result of implicit and explicit contracts
with their customers. Friberg and Wilander (2008) show that generally exporters and importers
negotiate over the invoicing currency of exports.4
Nakamura (2008), Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) and Nakamura and Zerom (2010) all nd
that delayed pass-through mostly occur at the wholesale level rather than at the retail level.
Nakamura (2008) analyses the pass-through of costs to wholesale and retail prices, using a large
panel dataset of U.S. retailers. Most of the price variations in the sample arise from retail-
level demand and supply shocks rather than manufacturer-level shocks.5 Gopinath and Itskhoki
(2010) review the closed and open economy empirical literature on real rigidities. A recurrent
and consistent nding in this literature is that the variable markup channel of real rigidities
is far less important for retail prices than for wholesale prices.6 Nakamura and Zerom (2010)
study the pass-through of commodity price shocks in the co¤ee industry. They nd that both
for wholesale and retail prices, a 1 percent increase in co¤ee commodity costs leads to about 0.3
percent increase in prices over the subsequent 6 quarters. To use Nakamura and Zeroms own
words, it is wholesale price rigidity that matters, so studies that focus exclusively on retail
prices may be incomplete in an important way.7
Motivated by all this evidence, we theoretically investigate the implications of long-term
relationships and bargaining for the response of prices and quantities to cost shocks. As in
Drozd and Nosal (2012) and Matha and Pierrard (2011), we model the formation of a B2B
relationship as a process of search and matching in the product market. If wholesalers invest
resources (marketing, advertising and sale managers) to nd new customers, retailers make an
e¤ort (e.g., their agents engage in negotiations) to conclude new business relationships with the
4Moreover, Goldberg and Tille (2009) nd that larger transactions are very often invoiced in the importers
currency. They show that this nding is consistent with a model where the invoicing currency is set by bargaining
between exporters and importers.
5Specically, the main determinant of the price variations is temporary sales.
6After reviewing the literature, Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) use unpublished international price data and
exchange rate shocks to evaluate the importance of real rigidities in price setting. They show that the pass-through
of import prices to exchange rate shocks, even conditionally on changing, is very low and delayed. This suggests
the presence of important real rigidities in the wholesale sector.
7Nakamura and Zerom (2010), p. 1193.
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wholesalers. The resulting B2B relationships lead to contracts for the exchange of intermediate
goods, and the volume of the trade depends on two margins of adjustment: an extensive margin
(the number of customers) and an intensive margin (the quantity exchanged in each match).
The search costs govern the extensive margin of adjustment and generate a surplus within
each match. Retailers and wholesalers bargain over this surplus, setting wholesale prices and
quantities in accordance with their relative bargaining power.
Our analysis highlights that wholesale prices and retail prices play di¤erent roles in industry
dynamics. Wholesale prices have to do mainly with the distribution of the rents between the
two parties in a contract, whereas retail prices are a reection of the costs of rapidly adjusting
marketing and distribution infrastructures for the sale of nal goods. Specically, studying the
response of variables to marginal costs shocks, we nd that the pass-through to wholesale and
retail prices depends on: the persistence of the shock, the elasticity of the demand of retailers
for wholesale goods along the intensive margin, and the bargaining power of retailers.
The persistence of cost shocks determines the incentives for rms to invest in new business
relationships. After a cost shock, rms can increase production either by increasing the trade
per match, by forming new business relationships or by partially adjusting along both margins.
But, due to search costs, setting up new B2B relationships is a di¢ cult task. In the model, rms
nd this option convenient only if the cost shock is persistent enough. Otherwise, rms tend to
adjust only along the intensive margin. The cost of the adjustment along the intensive margin
is thus the foremost factor of the pass-through if the cost shock is transitory.
The sensitivity of both wholesale prices and retail prices to cost shocks depends on retailers
bargaining power. While the pass-through to wholesale prices is forcefully increasing in retailers
bargaining power, the pass-through to retail prices is non-monotonically and weakly related to
the bargaining power. The reason for this non-monotonic and weak e¤ect is that the bargaining
power a¤ects the distribution of the rents between wholesalers and retailers but not the reaction
of consumer prices to cost shocks.
The repeated nature of the interactions between rms points towards an intriguing issue:
observed wholesale prices may not be allocative, in the sense that they may not a¤ect the
retail prices faced by consumers nor their consumption decisions. This issue is very relevant,
especially in light of the recent empirical evidence, which suggests that nominal price stickiness
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arises mainly at the wholesale rather than at the retail level. In fact, as recognized at least since
Barro (1977), the stabilizing role of monetary policy when prices are sticky depends crucially on
prices being allocative. The B2B model provides a natural laboratory to address this issue.
We show that wholesale prices have no direct inuence on the intensive margin of trade, but
a¤ect the value of business relationships and thus the incentive to engage in search activities.
For this reason, the allocative power of wholesale prices depends on the perceived persistence of
the price change, and on the e¢ ciency of the matching process. The allocative power is large and
persistent if changes in wholesale prices are long-lasting and search externalities are substantial.
But in all other cases wholesale prices have a rather small allocative power, much smaller than
what the standard Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model implies.
The limited allocative power of intermediate goods prices has very interesting implications
for trade in open economy, where B2B relationships and bargaining are pervasive (Gopinath
and Rigobon, 2008). The empirical literature has largely analyzed the degree of exchange rate
pass-through (ERPT) to import prices, often to quantify the expenditure switching e¤ect of
changes in the exchange rate.8 The expenditure switching channel implicitly assumes that a
shock to the exchange rate a¤ects the consumption of imported goods only to the extent that
it translates into the variability of import prices. This can be true only if prices are allocative.
To address this issue, in the last part of the paper we present a simple open economy ex-
tension of our model. In the extended model, domestic wholesalers need to establish customer
relationships with both local retailers and foreign retailers. We nd that, even in situations in
which the allocative power of wholesale prices is low, exchange rate shocks maintain a signicant
expenditure switching e¤ect. In fact, exchange rate changes a¤ect the total surplus of interna-
tional transactions and, consequently, have direct e¤ect on the intensive margin of trade. This
is independent of the reaction of the bargained price, so that the overall amount of expenditure
switching is more a function of the costs of adjusting trade along the extensive and intensive
margins than of the ERPT to border (wholesale) prices. We conclude that focusing only on
the degree of ERPT to measure the expenditure switching e¤ect of exchange rate shocks can be
misleading for industries where long-term relationships and bargaining are widespread.
8See Burstein and Gopinath (2013) for an extensive discussion of various theories and empirical ndings on
the relation between exchange rates and prices.
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Our work is related to a growing literature that investigates the role of long-term relationships
for price and business cycle dynamics.9 Most of these works focus on the relationship between a
nal consumer and a rm, not between two rms. This is conceptually important, for bargaining
between rms is arguably more realistic than bargaining between a rm and a consumer.
Our paper builds on Drozd and Nosal (2012) and Matha and Pierrard (2011). Both of these
works extend macroeconomic frameworks to include search frictions in the product market.
Drozd and Nosal (2012) do so in an international business cycle model, to explain the deviation
of the prices of internationally traded goods from the law of one price. Matha and Pierrard
(2011) provide some evidence on the relevance of B2B relationships and introduce them in the
model by King and Rebelo (1999), to study the e¤ect on standard real business cycle dynamics.
Our work di¤ers from theirs in two important dimensions. First, we focus on industry dynamics.
This approach is useful to identify the principal industry-level determinants of incomplete pass-
through and can be easily related to the empirical literature on pass-through. Second, we address
a di¤erent question. We carefully study how the intensive margin of adjustment a¤ects the pass-
through of cost shocks to prices, and then analyze the role played by wholesale prices in the
adjustment of quantities to marginal cost shocks and exchange rate shocks.
Finally, our paper is close, in spirit, to Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010), who develop a static
bargaining model between one nal good producer and a number of intermediate good suppliers.
This model is used as a micro-foundation for a quantitative analysis with variable markups at the
wholesale level but constant markups at the retail level. Our paper shares with Gopinath and
Itskhoki (2010) the idea that introducing negotiations between rms is key to understand pricing
dynamics, but di¤ers in many important aspects. Most prominently, our model is dynamic and
takes into account the need for rms to invest in building new long-term relationships.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we derive the benchmark closed-
economy model. In Section 3 we examine the e¤ects of cost shocks on industry dynamics and
the pass-through to wholesale and retail prices. Based on these ndings, Section 4 focuses on the
role of trading frictions and bargaining and on the allocative power of wholesale prices. Section
5 is devoted to the open economy extension, and Section 6 concludes.
9To cite a few, recent works include Hall (2008), Arseneau and Chugh (2007), Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009),
Ravn et al. (2010), Michaillat and Saez (2013) and den Haan (2013).
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2 Model
Let us consider a generic industry where wholesale rms produce intermediate goods. Retailers
transform these products in nal consumption goods and sell them to households. Retailers
are perfectly competitive rms, but the interaction between retailers and wholesalers is subject
to trade frictions. Both types of rms need to search in order to nd a party to make deals
with, and contracts are signed after bilateral bargaining. The search and matching scheme is
the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search model.
2.1 Demand for Retail Goods
The economy is composed of a continuum of sectors (or industries), each producing a specic
good. The demand for the good produced in industry i is given by
cit =

pit
Pt
 
Ct
where  is the elasticity of substitution between good i and the good produced in any other
industry. Pt and Ct, respectively, denote the aggregate price and consumption levels. Since we
focus on industry dynamics, we follow Ravn et al. (2010) and take Pt and Ct as given. This
simplies the demand function for good i to
cit = A
 
pit
 
(1)
where A is a positive constant.
In industry i, retail rms sell di¤erent brands of the same good. But, di¤erently from the
case of goods across industries, we assume that brands (within each industry) are perfectly
substitutable. We borrow this assumption from Kleshchelski and Vincent (2009). Consistently
with our focus on a generic industry, we drop the industry-specic index i from the rest of the
paper.
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2.2 Wholesale Firms
In the industry there is a continuum of wholesale rms. In order to sell their products, wholesale
producers need to establish customer relationships with retailers. The total number of B2B
relationships in the industry, Tt, follow the law of motion
Tt = (1  ) (Tt 1 +Mt 1)
where  is the exogenous rate at which business relationships are destroyed andMt is the number
of new B2B relationships. Mt is a constant return to scale aggregator of retailerssearch e¤ort dt
(e.g., purchase managerse¤ort) and wholesalerssearch e¤ort at (advertising and marketing):
Mt = ~ma

td
1 
t
where ~m > 0. Total trade volumes depend on both the number of relationships Tt (extensive
margin) and the units bought for each relationship qt (intensive margin). Wholesalers take
the number of new matches per unit of e¤ort, kat =
Mt
at
= ~m (t)
 (1 ), as given. t = atdt is
the product market tightness of the industry, dened as the ratio of advertisement e¤ort per
purchasing e¤ort.
Firms discount future prots at the constant rate  2 (0; 1).10 The law of motion of a
customer base for wholesaler j is
Tt (j) = (1  )
 
Tt 1 (j) + at 1 (j) kat 1

(2)
Note that Tt (j) is a state variable, as it takes time (one month, under our calibration) to
establish a business relationship. The marginal cost of producing one intermediate variety,
mct (j), is assumed to be exogenous and independent of scale. Wholesale rms face a search
cost to establish new business relationships that is convex in the search intensity of wholesalers
xwt (j) =
at(j)
Tt(j)
:

2
(xwt (j))
2 Tt (j)
10 In a full-edged general equilibrium model, the discount factor of the rm would be an endogenous variable
given by the representative households intertemporal marginal rate of substitution. See also Ravn et al. (2010).
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Modelling the search cost as a function of the search intensity has a great advantage for our
purpose here. It shuts down the so-called intrarm bargaining a feature we are not interested
in because the bargained price is going to be independent of the number of B2B relationships.11
Wholesalers maximize the expected present value of future prots
E0
1X
t=0
t
n
[pWt (j) mct (j)] qt (j)Tt (j)  
2
(xwt (j))
2 Tt (j)
o
subject to the law of motion of the customer base (2).12 At the beginning of the period the rm
chooses the advertising e¤ort xwt (j), whereas wholesale prices pWt (j) and quantities qt (j) are
decided after the successful match with retailers.
The solution to the maximization problem gives the following rst order conditions:

xwt (j)
kat
=  (1  )EtWt+1 (j) (3)
Wt (j) = [pWt (j) mct (j)] qt (j) + 
2
(xwt (j))
2 +  (1  )EtWt+1 (j) (4)
The rst condition equates the expected search cost of an additional match (the left hand side)
to its expected benet, given by the expected value of a business relationship for a wholesaler.
In the second condition, Wt (j) the marginal value of existing business relationships for a
wholesale rm is the sum of three elements: the total prot from established relationships, the
savings in the costs of establishing new matches, 2 (xwt (j))
2, and the expected future value of
the relationships. Note that, because of the search frictions, wholesalersprot maximization is
not a static problem but an intertemporal choice. In fact, the search intensity and the value of
an existing relationship both depend on the expected future value of a business relationship.
2.3 Retail Firms
There are an innite number of retailers intermediating between wholesale producers and nal
consumers. As wholesalers, at the beginning of the period retailers choose their investment in
forming new business relationships, captured by the search rate xRt (r) =
dt(r)
Tt(r)
. Retailers take
11This specication of the search cost is a simplication of the bargaining problem, which has been used in the
labor search literature by Gertler and Trigari (2009) and Thomas (2008) for the same purpose of abstracting from
intrarm bargaining.
12Notice that we implicitly assume symmetry among the matches of each wholesaler.
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as given the rate at which search e¤ort leads to a new match, dened as
kRt =
Mt
dt
= ~mt ,
as well as the search cost to establish new matches. The search cost is convex in the search
intensity xRt (r):

2
(xRt (r))
2 Tt (r)
Once matched with wholesalers, each retailer r has a technology which transforms wholesale
goods into retail goods. It is important to remark at this point that, for the intensive margin to
be meaningful, we need to introduce a cost of changing the quantity sold per match. If changing
qt (r) were costless, rms would nd it optimal to have few matches (since it is costly to establish
long-term relationships) and satisfy changes in demand with changes in qt (r). This would go
against the essence of our model, the idea being that rms must engage in search and matching
to expand their production, and would make the problem not well-dened.
To address this aspect, we introduce costs in changing the quantity sold per match through
the production function of retailers. Specically, we assume that, for each match k, retailers
have a technology that transforms qt (k) units of the wholesale good into (qt (k)  !t (k)) units
of retail goods. The term !t (k) =
 
2 (qt (k)  q)2 is an adjustment cost in the units bought
per match. Intuitively, q is the quantity per match that maximizes the technical e¢ ciency of
the production process of retailers. Deviations from this optimal amount decrease the marginal
productivity of the intermediate good variety. The total production of retailer r is thus given
9
by:13
yt (r) =
Tt(r)Z
0
(qt (k)  !t (k)) dk = (qt (r)  !t (r))Tt (r) (5)
where we have imposed symmetry among the matches. This production function has three main
attractive features. First, it displays diminishing returns to qt for (both upwards and downwards)
deviations from the technically optimal level q. Second, it introduces an incentive for retailers
to buy from di¤erent wholesalers (similar to a love for varieties). Third and most importantly,
it is very exible, in that it includes both the linear case and the extensive-margin-only case as
special cases. More precisely, for  ! 0, the production function is linear in qt (k) and retailers
can adjust their production on the intensive margin very easily. For  ! 1, qt (k) = q at any
time t: the intensive margin is closed, and rms can adjust production only by establishing new
business relationships.
Each retailer maximizes the expected present value of future prots
E0
1X
t=0
t
h
ptyt (r)  pWt (r) qt (r)Tt (r)  
2
(xRt (r))
2 Tt (r)
i
subject to the law of motion of the customer base
Tt (r) = (1  )
 
Tt 1 (r) + dt 1 (r) kRt 1

(6)
and the production function (5). Since retail rms sell the nal good in a perfectly competitive
market, they take the nal price of the retail good, pt, as given in the maximization problem.
13A natural alternative would be to endogenize the intensive margin by assuming that each retailer buys
di¤erentiated goods from a range of wholesalers and has a love of varietymotive (common in the trade literature)
that leads him to value buying from many wholesalers in itself. The production function of retailers would be:
yt =
24 TtZ
0
qitdi
351=
with  < 1. The main reason why we chose a di¤erent specication is that the production function (5) is more
exible, since it nests both the linear case ( ! 0) and the extensive-margin-only case ( ! 1) as special
cases. This allows us to analyze more neatly the role of the intensive margin of trade adjustment for the cost
pass-through.
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So the solution to the problem gives:

xRt (r)
kRt
=  (1  )EtJt+1 (r) (7)
Jt (r) = pt (qt (r)  !t (r))  pWt (r) qt (r) + 
2
(xRt (r))
2 +  (1  )EtJt+1 (r) (8)
The rst condition equates the expected search costs of an additional match (the left hand
side) to its expected benet, given by the expected value of a business relationship for a re-
tailer. The second equation determines the value of a business relationship for a retailer,
Jt (r), as the sum of these three elements: the gross prots from an established relationship
pt (qt (r)  !t (r)) pWt (r) qt (r), the savings in the costs of establishing a B2B relationship and
the expected continuation value.
2.4 Bargaining
The presence of a surplus associated with existing long-term relationships implies that there
are many combinations of wholesale prices and quantities consistent with the equilibrium (Hall,
2005; 2008). Existing B2B relationships are privately e¢ cient as long as they generate a positive
surplus for both the parties involved in the bargaining. Therefore, any price path such that
Wt (j)  0 and Jt (r)  0 8t can be an equilibrium path. Interestingly, as emphasized by Hall
(2007), this opens the way for equilibrium sticky prices in customer markets.14
In line with the labor market literature, the solution to this issue is the surplus sharing
solution of a Nash (1950) bargaining problem.15 Wholesaler and retailer of a bilateral contract
nd a joint solution for the price and quantity of a transaction, so to maximize the Nash product
St (j; r):
St (j; r) =
h
(Wt (j))
1  (Jt (r))
i
where  2 [0; 1] is the bargaining power of retailers. The solution with respect to the wholesale
14See also Blanchard and Galì (2010) for a similar argument in the context of a labor search model. Arseneau
and Chugh (2007) exploit this insight and analyze the implications of di¤erent pricing schemes on the price
dynamics in a model with consumer search.
15See also Matha and Pierrard (2011) and Drozd and Nosal (2012).
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price gives an optimal sharing rule
Wt (j) = (1  ) Jt (r) ; (9)
which implies:
pWt (j; r) =  [mct (j)  
Wt (j; r)] + (1  )

pt

1  !t (j; r)
qt (j; r)

+
Rt (j; r)

(10)
where 
Wt (j; r) =

2
(xwt(j))
2
qt(j;r)
and 
Rt (j; r) =

2
(xRt(r))
2
qt(j;r)
are the savings in the costs of forming
B2B relationships per unit of trade for wholesalers and retailers, respectively.
The wholesale price is an average of two terms, weighted by the bargaining power of the
contracting parties. The two terms express not only the costs of production, but also the
valuation of retailers. The rst term, mct (j) 
Wt (j; r), represents the minimum amount that
wholesalers are willing to accept. This depends on marginal costs and on the savings in the
cost of forming another business relationship. The second term, pt

1  !t(j;r)qt(j;r)

+ 
Rt (j; r),
represents the maximum price that retailers are willing to pay, which is the sum of retailers
marginal revenues and of retailerssavings in the costs of establishing another B2B relationship.
The bargaining power  determines which party gets the most of the surplus.
The optimal sharing rule (9) also implies:


kat
xwt (j) = (1  ) 
kRt
xRt (r)
Aggregating across all rms and taking log-deviations, this gives:
a^t = d^t and ^t = 0
This means that the assumption of complete symmetry in the search problem of wholesalers
and retailers implies a one-to-one relationship between changes in retailerssearch e¤ort

d^t

and in wholesalerse¤ort (a^t). As a consequence, the product market tightness ^t is invariant
to marginal cost shocks. But, note, it is not invariant to other innovations that we explore later
12
on in the paper.16
While the bargained price is set in a way to split the surplus between the two parties in pro-
portion to their bargaining power, wholesalers and retailers choose qt (j; r) in a way to maximize
the total surplus from a long term relationship. Specically, the solution of the maximization
problem with respect to quantities gives:
pt (qt (j; r)  q) = pt  mct (j) (11)
Thus, the marginal benet of an additional unit sold in the retail market given by the total
prot margin pt mct (j) needs to be equal to the marginal cost of increasing the quantity per
match qt (j; r) above q. This cost is larger, the higher the adjustment cost parameter  .
To get further intuition, we can rewrite (11) as:
qt (j; r) = q +
1
 

tott (j; r)  1
tott (j; r)

(12)
where tott (j; r) =
pt
mct(j)
is the total gross mark-up of retail prices over marginal costs. The
volume of trade per match is an increasing function of the total prot margin of retailers and
wholesalers.17 More importantly, note that the units traded in each match depend directly on
the nal retail price pt but are set independently of the wholesale price pWt; in fact, pWt does
not enter equation (12). This questions the role played by wholesale prices in the adjustment of
trade to cost shocks.
2.5 Aggregation
Industry level relations are found by aggregating across all retailers r and wholesalers j under
the assumption of complete symmetry across rms. For instance, the aggregate consumption of
the nal good of industry i is:
ct =
24 1Z
0
ct (r) dr
35 = A (pt)  = yt =
24 1Z
0
yt (r) dr
35
16Specically, the bargaining power shock we study in Section 5 will break the tight link between d^t and a^t.
17As long as tott (j; r) > 1, qt (j; r) is set above q because retailers and wholesalers agree on a production
strategy that exploits the market power related to the presence of search frictions.
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All other equations are identical to the individual rms case and are therefore not repeated
here.
2.6 Search Externalities and Constrained E¢ cient Allocation
In a decentralized equilibrium, wholesalers and retailers decide their search intensity taking the
rates at which additional e¤ort leads to a new match, kat and k
R
t , as given. This way each
rm chooses its optimal level of search without internalizing the e¤ect of its decision on other
rms. Summing up across rms, this may lead to suboptimal choices at the aggregate level.
The constrained e¢ cient allocation can be found as the solution of the problem of a benevolent
social planner who faces the same technological constraints and search frictions that are present
in the decentralized equilibrium.18
Proposition 1 The decentralized equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient only if the Hosios condition
 = 1   holds.
Proof. Appendix A.
Proposition 1 requires that social and private gains from participating in a matching process
are equal, as retailersbargaining power  equals the elasticity of the matching function with
respect to retailers search 1   . Otherwise, either retailers private gains ( > 1   ) or
wholesalersprivate gains ( < 1  ) are larger than their respective social gains.
2.7 Calibration and Steady State
The model is calibrated at the monthly frequency. The discount rate  is 0:996. Following in
Ravn et al. (2010), the elasticity of substitution  across industries takes the standard value
of 6. We set  = 1, as a baseline value for the size of the adjustment costs along the intensive
margin. The elasticity of the matching function to wholesalersmarketing e¤ort, , and the
bargaining power of retailers, , are both equal to 0:5. This implies that there is complete
symmetry between wholesalers and retailers and that the Hosios condition holds. The e¢ ciency
of the matching technology ~m is chosen so that, in steady state, the monthly rate at which
18To derive the constrained e¢ cient allocation in a partial equilibrium setup, we follow Hosios (1990). See also
Matha and Pierrard (2011) for a similar analysis in a general equilibrium setting.
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search e¤ort leads to new business relationships is ka = kR = 0:2. This rate is approximately
the monthly equivalent of the quarterly rate of 0:5 used by Matha and Pierrard (2011). We use
a similar strategy for the separation rate . We set it to 0:10, which is slightly higher than the
monthly equivalent of the quarterly rate of 0:25 in Matha and Pierrard (2011).
The total markup of retail prices over marginal costs from equation (12) is an endogenous
variable in the model. In the long run, this markup is increasing in both retailersand whole-
salerssearch costs:
tot =
q
(q   !) +

mc (q   !)

~b
xw
ka
+
xR
kR

 

x2w
2
+
x2R
2

where ~b = 1 (1 )(1 ) . The rst term shows that the markup is above 1 so long as q di¤ers from
the optimal value q (q = 1 by normalization), that is, so long as there is a positive cost of
transforming intermediate goods into nal goods, !. The second term shows that tot is even
larger if ~b
 
xw
ka +
xR
kR
 x2w2 + x2R2  > 0, which is true for reasonable values of the search costs. We
assume a long-run total markup of 1:10, and this implies a search e¤ort parameter  = 0:3457.
Properties of the steady state. The steady state depends crucially on two parameters:
 , the curvature of the demand of retailers for the variety produced by each wholesaler, and ,
retailersrelative bargaining power. We analyze the sensitivity of the steady state to these two
parameters, keeping  xed and letting tot change along with other key variables. The results
are in Table 1.
To start with, consider the impact of the adjustment costs along the intensive margin. If
 = 100000, the intensive margin is closed: q = q = 1 and the total markup of retail prices over
marginal costs is 1:105. With a lower  ( = 1), the model displays both intensive and extensive
margins of adjustment. Firms optimally trade-o¤ the costs of increasing production along the
extensive margin (search and matching costs) with the costs of increasing production along
the intensive margin. The steady state stock of business relationships decreases, whereas the
quantity sold per match increases to q = 1:091 > q. The higher q depresses prices and markups,
which are now (slightly) smaller than before. This result is even stronger if we continue to lower
 , as rms progressively lose the incentive to engage in B2B relationships. For  = 0:00001,
rms nd it optimal to have very few matches (T = 0:007) and satisfy changes in demand by
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adjusting q (q = 144:50). Prices and markups are now both close to 1. Thus, this numerical
exercise conrms that there should be frictions along the intensive margin for rms to be willing
to invest in building B2B relationships.
Consider now the role of the bargaining power of retailers. In the baseline calibration ( =
0:5), the number of B2B relationships is relatively high, and the total markup on a nal product
is around 1:10. Intuitively, since buyers and sellers have the same bargaining power, they make
the same search e¤ort and the product market is very uid ( = ad = 1). This facilitates the
formation of new matches. Indeed, since  = 0:5, the steady state satises the Hosios condition
and the matching process is Pareto e¢ cient. But an industry displaying a  di¤erent from
1    = 0:5 is generally characterized by a lower stock of B2B relationships, a higher quantity
exchanged per match and total markup, and search externalities. It is precisely the presence of
ine¢ ciencies in the matching process that leads to the higher tot.
When wholesalers have a very high bargaining power ( = 0:1), they seize the most of the
surplus from a business relationship and their private gains are larger than the socially optimal
level. As a consequence, they overinvest in advertising and marketing activities, while retailers
have very little interest in searching. In this case, the product market is very tightfrom the
point of view of wholesalers ( = 3), and the process of matching becomes sclerotic (the steady
state number of B2B relationships drops). Something similar happens when retailers have most
of the bargaining power ( = 0:9), though this time it is retailers that enjoy private benets
and overinvest. In fact, given the assumption of complete symmetry in the search problem of
retailers and wholesalers, upward and downward deviations of equal size from  = 0:5 have the
same e¤ects on T and p. The main di¤erence lies in the evolution of the wholesale price pW .
When  is high, pW is low and most of the prots go to retailers; when  is low, pW is high and
wholesalers get most of the rents.
3 Cost Shocks: Industry Dynamics and Pass-Through
The pass-through of marginal cost shocks is complete if a 1 percent increase in marginal costs
leads to a 1 percent increase in prices; otherwise, prices increase by less than marginal costs and
the pass-through is incomplete. To determine the degree of pass-through in our model, we look
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at the reaction of wholesale and retail prices to innovations in the marginal costs of wholesalers.
We assume that the marginal cost shock is industry-specic and follows an AR (1) process:
cmct = cmct 1 + "t (13)
where variables with a hat denote log deviations from steady state,  2 [0; 1) is the serial
correlation of marginal costs and "t is an i.i.d. shock.19 Note that, since rms are symmetric,
we omit rm-specic indexes from now on.
We proceed in two steps. We start with the case of purely transitory cost shocks, when the
model has a simple analytical solution, and then pass to the case of persistent cost shocks.
3.1 Transitory Cost Shocks
The analytical solution of the model with transitory marginal costs shocks ( = 0) is summarized
by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If marginal cost shocks cmct are transitory, i.e. if  = 0, the solution of the
model is:
T^t = 0 q^t =  Bqcmct y^t = T^t + q^t p^t =   1

y^t
implying that the wholesale price equals
p^Wt =


mc
pW
+ (1  ) p (q   !)
pW q


Bq +AqBq
 cmct
with Bq = 1 totq+

,  = qq ! [1   (q   q)], Aq =
h
(1  ) (1  ) p(q !)pW q + (1  )

R
pW
  
WpW
i
2
[0; 1). Bq is the elasticity of q^t to changes in the total prot margin,  captures the increase in
retailers production due to an increase in q^t and Aq represents the elasticity of the wholesale
price to changes in q^t.20
Proof. Appendix B.
19Our strategy follows Ravn et al. (2010).
20Bq is decreasing in  and increasing in  and Bq ! 0 if  !1. Aq is decreasing in  and  and converges
to 0 for  !1 and for  ! 1.  is decreasing in  and ! 1 for  ! 0.
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Put it di¤erently, this proposition indicates that rms do not have incentives to adjust along
the extensive margin when the shock is expected to die out immediately in the near future,
and the problem becomes static (i.e. x^wt = x^Rt = T^t = 0). In this case, the response of retail
quantities and prices depends on the adjustment costs along the intensive margin. The lower
the adjustment cost  , the easier it is for retailers to adjust their production and distribution
structure. In turn, a strong reduction in the production of retail goods increases retail prices by
a factor linked to , the elasticity of the demand for the good produced in the industry. Ceteris
paribus, the lower , the higher the pass-through to retail prices. The pass-through to retail
prices is complete only if the adjustment along the intensive margin is entirely frictionless (i.e.
for  ! 0); otherwise, it is incomplete.
Wholesale prices are a¤ected by three channels. First, there is the direct marginal cost
channel, the term  mcpW in the proposition above. This term captures the direct inuence of
the marginal costs of wholesalers on the bargained price and increases with the bargaining
power of retailers. The second channel is related to retailersreservation price and is given by
(1  ) p(q !)pW q Bq. This term is larger, the more retail prices react to cost shocks or the higher
the bargaining power of wholesalers. The nal term, AqBq, is the bargained quantity e¤ect.
That is, wholesalers are willing to ask for a lower price insofar as retailers are willing to buy more
units of the intermediate good. For instance, an increase in marginal costs provokes a reduction
in q^t, and this through the bargained quantity e¤ect translates into a higher wholesale price
p^Wt. This e¤ect is stronger, the lower are  and .
Corollary 3 When  = 0:
(i) the pass-through to retail prices converges to 1 for  ! 0.
(ii) the pass-through to wholesale prices converges to 1 when one of the following
conditions is met: 1)  ! 0; 2)  ! 1.
(iii) wholesale prices only play a distributive role, not an allocative one.
The second point of this corollary is a combined e¤ect of the three channels driving p^Wt.
The last result that wholesale prices do not have an allocative role is instead a consequence of
the fact that the dynamics of the price and quantity of retail goods is independent of wholesale
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prices: p^t =   q^t and y^t = q^t. Thus, in case of one-time cost shocks, the only role of wholesale
prices concerns the distribution of the rents between wholesalers and retailers.
An interesting special case is when retailers face prohibitively high production adjustment
costs (i.e., for  ! 1). In this case, intermediate trade takes place only along the extensive
margin of adjustment. So, after a purely transitory cost shock, there is zero pass-through to
retail prices, and the pass-through to wholesale prices is proportional to the bargaining power
of retailers :
p^t = 0
p^Wt = 
mc
pW
cmct
The zero pass-through result stems directly from the search frictions. On the one hand, rms
can only increase production by forming new business relationships, so output becomes a state
variable; it can only adjust with one month delay. On the other hand, since the demand function
implies a one-to-one relationship between consumption and prices, the matching frictions impede
the reaction of both consumption and retail prices. But, at the same time, rms have no
incentive to either create or destroy B2B relationships (modifying their search e¤ort) because
the cost shock is purely transitory. Firms absorb the shock completely through changes in the
markup. The wholesale price divides the burden of the markup adjustment between wholesalers
and retailers, proportionally to the corresponding bargaining power. Hence, in an environment
where rms are hit by idiosyncratic cost shocks, our model can yield complete price rigidity and
time-varying markups.
3.2 Persistent Cost Shocks
Though rms are reluctant to engage in costly search activities when shocks are transitory, their
reaction to persistent cost shocks is quite di¤erent.
Table 2 displays the response of marginal costs, prices and markups to a mildly persistent
marginal cost shock ( = 0:5
1
3 ) under our baseline calibration. On impact, rms reduce both
the units sold per match and their advertising and marketing activities (signalled by the fall
in at). The reduction in the units per match leads to an increase in retail prices, while the
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pass-through to wholesale prices is almost proportional to the bargaining power of retailers.
The e¤ects of the reduction in advertising and marketing show up in the rst period after the
shock and persist over time. The disinvestment in long-term relationships causes a prolonged
reduction in the stock of B2B and in the total production of the industry. As a result, there is a
persistent reaction of wholesale and retail prices. However, the pass-through to both retail and
wholesale prices is still quite low, and most of the cost shock is absorbed through movements in
the markup.
Figure 1 shows the e¤ects of an increase in marginal costs for di¤erent values of the persistence
of the shock:  = 0; 0:6; 0:99. We see that, although the increase in marginal costs has a positive
e¤ect on prices, the degree of pass-through is directly proportional to  being very short-lived
for  = 0. This is because the more persistent the cost shock, the higher the willingness of rms
to absorb the shock by reducing advertising and marketing e¤ort. The reduction in advertising
and marketing leads to a decline in both B2B relationships and consumption.
Intuitively, if the shock is purely transitory, rms expect costs to go back to normal levels
immediately after, and adjusting advertising and marketing is not an option for them. On
the other hand, a persistent shock signals that marginal costs shall be high for many periods
ahead, so rms do not mind losing business relationships. The real e¤ects on consumption are
consequently larger and considerably more persistent in this second case.
These results suggest that rms have a preference for the intensive margin or the extensive
margin, depending on the persistence of the shock. Firms absorb cost shocks along the intensive
margin when shocks are transitory and along the extensive margin when shocks are persistent.21
Nonetheless, the pass-through is never complete for reasonable calibrations.
4 Bargaining, Trading Frictions and Prices
As Corollary 3 shows for the case of transitory cost shocks, the pass-through to prices depends
remarkably on the adjustment costs along the intensive margin and the bargaining power of
the rms in a contract. In this section, we study the e¤ect of these two factors in the case of
persistent cost shocks. Consistently with Nakamura and Zeroms (2010) nding that cost shocks
21This is consistent with the empirical evidence by Ruhl (2008), who nds that the extensive margin of trade
responds to permanent shocks but not to transitory shocks.
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in the co¤ee industry are highly persistent, we carry out this exercise setting  = 0:95.22
4.1 Adjustment Costs on the Intensive Margin and Pass-Through
Figure 2 shows how production adjustment costs inuence the response of the model to the
increase in marginal costs. We consider three cases: the baseline scenario of  = 1 where rms
use both intensive and extensive margins as well as a lower adjustment costs scenario ( = 0:1)
and higher adjustment costs scenario ( = 100000). With  = 0:1, retailers nd it convenient
to adjust production along the intensive margin. On the other hand, with  = 100000, rms
rely only on the extensive margin.
The response of prices to cost shocks changes considerably with  , suggesting that the
curvature of retailersdemand on the intensive margin has a strong e¤ect on the degree of pass-
through. Pass-through to wholesale and retail prices is low and delayed for medium to high
level of adjustment costs ( = 1 or  = 100000). It is instead quite larger when adjusting
the quantity per match is relatively cheap ( = 0:1). Having the possibility to adjust along
an intensive margin, rms react much faster to marginal cost shocks: retail prices are more
responsive, and so are wholesale prices. Nevertheless, the intensive margin is not enough to
generate complete pass-through under reasonable calibrations. Pass-through to retail prices
remains below 0:6 even when  = 0:1.23
4.2 Bargaining Power and Pass-Through
Figure 3 displays the pass-through of costs to prices for increasing values of retailersbargaining
power . The rst graph of Figure 3 shows the impact response of prices to a one percent
increase in marginal costs, the second graph the response of prices to an increase in marginal
costs after one year.
Retailersbargaining power a¤ects the pass-through to wholesale prices and to retail prices
di¤erently. The pass-through to wholesale prices is increasing in , both on impact and after one
22Nakamura and Zerom (2010) nd that, in the co¤ee industry, a Dickey-Fuller test for the hypothesis of a
unit root cannot be rejected at the 5% level. For simplicity, we focus here on very persistent, but stationary, cost
processes.
23 In our model there are two ways to achieve complete pass-through to both retail and wholesale prices. The
rst way is to eliminate the curvature on q, letting  ! 0. The second way is to eliminate search frictions, letting
 ! 0.
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year. On the other hand, the pass-through to retail prices is non-monotonic in : it is maximum
when the Hosios condition is met, and decreases symmetrically as we move away from  = 1 :
At rst sight, the idea that the reaction of wholesale prices to wholesalersmarginal cost
shocks gets larger with retailers bargaining power  may seem counterintuitive. It would be
reasonable to expect that retailers force wholesalers to absorb the shock keeping the bargained
price unchanged, the more, the larger .
To clarify this result, consider the evolution of the bargained wholesale price:
p^Wt = 

mc
pW
cmct   
W
pW

^Wt

+ (1  )

p
pW q
(q   !) [p^t   (1  ) q^t] + 
R
pW

^Rt

The wholesale price depends on the reservation price of wholesalers (rst term) and the reser-
vation price of retailers (second term). When wholesalers have most of the bargaining power
(i.e., for low ), they get the most of the surplus from a business relationship. In this case, the
wholesale price is strictly related to the retailersreservation price. At the limit (i.e., for  ! 0),
there is not even a direct link between marginal cost shocks, mcpW cmct, and wholesale prices. When
retailers have most of the bargaining power (i.e. for high ), the e¤ect of wholesalersmarginal
costs on p^Wt is instead strong. It can be shown that, for  ! 1, mcpW = 1 and the pass-through
to wholesale prices is complete.
The pass-through to retail prices depends on how easy it is to adjust production, respectively,
along the extensive margin and along the intensive margin:
p^t =   1


T^t + q^t

The bargaining power does not inuence p^t directly but only indirectly. The indirect e¤ect is a
consequence of the fact that the matching process is more or less e¢ cient depending on . This
a¤ects T^t and is the cause of the inverted-U shape of p^t with respect to .24 When  = 1  = 0:5,
the matching process is Pareto e¢ cient and the search externalities are internalized. The large
pass-through to retail prices stems from the large variation along the extensive margin. In
contrast, when either retailers or wholesalers have most of the bargaining power (i.e.,  = 0:1
24See Figure 4.
22
or  = 0:9), there are search externalities and the adjustment along the extensive margin gets
very expensive for either side of the product market. That is, the product market is very tight
and the matching process sclerotic. However, the overall e¤ect of  on the pass-through to retail
goods is very small in comparison with its e¤ect on the pass-through to wholesale prices.
4.3 On the Allocative Role of Wholesale Prices
When prices are sticky, monetary policy can play a stabilizing role. But, as Barro (1977) points
out, even with sticky prices monetary policy has real e¤ects only if prices are allocative, that is,
only if prices are relevant signals for consumption decisions.
In our model, the allocative power of wholesale prices depends on the persistence of the
change in this price. When the price change is purely transitory, wholesale prices only play a
distributive role; they are not allocative (Corollary 3). When the price change is expected to
last in the future, there is instead a potentially allocative role for wholesale prices, on top of
their distributive role. This happens because the incentive for rms to engage in costly search
activities depends on the expected benets of a B2B relationship, which are in turn inuenced
by the future expected wholesale price. So the question to answer next is: to what extent are
wholesale prices allocative when an industry is exposed to persistent shocks?
To answer this question, we look at the response of retail prices and consumption to a
persistent increase in wholesale prices. Interestingly, this can be interpreted as a negative shock
to retailersbargaining power, ^t, for this shock a¤ects wholesale prices but not retail prices.
Formally:
p^Wt = 

mc
pW
cmct   
W
pW

^Wt

+ (1  )

p (q   !)
pW q
[p^t   (1  ) q^t] + 
R
pW

^Rt

 A^t
where A = JpW q [1   (1  )].25 An increase in the bargaining power of wholesalers (i.e. a
reduction of ^t) raises p^Wt and is thus equivalent to an exogenous shock to wholesale prices.
Figure 5 compares the e¤ects of wholesale price increases in the B2B model with the ones
25Note that, ceteris paribus, the persistence of the bargaining power shock  reduces the response of wholesale
prices to the bargaining power shock. This is a consequence of the repeated nature of the interactions between
rms. So bargaining rms look into the future and account for the expected continuation value of a match. For
instance, retailers are willing to accept a higher wholesale price today if they expect to get a high share of the
surplus in the future.
23
obtained in the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition model. ^t is assumed to follow an
AR (1) process with persistence  = 0:95. In order to facilitate the comparison of the results
between the two models, we scale the bargaining shock in the context of the B2B model in such
a way that the impact increase in p^Wt is the same as the one in the Dixit-Stigliz (1997) model.26
Specically, wholesale prices increase by 1 percent on impact.
In the standard monopolistic competition model, an increase in wholesale prices causes a
proportional increase in retail prices (the pass-through is complete) and a strong reduction in
nal goods consumption y^t. In the B2B model, the response of retail prices and consumption
depends crucially on the initial conditions in the product market. Specically, it depends on
the initial bargaining power of the two parties. When wholesalers have most of the bargaining
power ( = 0:1), the increase in wholesale prices leads to a reduction in consumption and to
an increase in retail prices, as in Dixit-Stiglitz. When retailers are the dominant party in the
negotiations ( = 0:9), an increase in wholesale price has opposite e¤ects to those in Dixit-
Stiglitz: consumption increases and retail prices falls. Finally, if the two parties have fully
symmetric bargaining power ( = 0:5), wholesale price shocks do not a¤ect both retail prices
and consumption. In this case, p^Wt does not have any allocative power.
These, perhaps surprising, results are due to the search externalities in the product market.
A persistent increase in wholesale prices raises the expected value of business relationships
for wholesalers but reduces that for retailers. Consequently, following the shock wholesalers
increase their search intensity, while retailers reduce it. But the intensity of these reactions
depends on the initial bargaining power. When wholesalers have most of the bargaining power
( = 0:1 < 1 ), the product market is very tight on the side of wholesalers, and the bargaining
power shock only worsens the situation. The formation of new matches is strongly reduced
because retailers are reluctant to make search e¤orts, and this is only partly compensated by
an increase in the intensive margin. Total consumption decreases and the pass-through to retail
prices is positive but delayed. On the contrary, when wholesalers are the weak party in the
negotiations ( = 0:9 > 1   ), the wholesale price shock reduces the tightness of the market,
26 In the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model the pass-through of wholesale price shocks to retail prices is complete,
i.e. p^t = p^Wt. Consumption is then obtained using the sectorial demand condition: c^t =  p^t =  p^Wt: The
evolution of wholesale prices, p^Wt, in the Dixit-Stiglitz model is modeled as an AR (1) process with persistence
. This is identical to the evolution of p^Wt in the B2B model when  = 0:5.
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and improves the e¢ ciency of the matching process. The number of business relationships
increases, leading to higher consumption and lower retail prices. When the Hosios condition is
veried ( = 0:5 = 1   ), the additional search e¤ort by wholesalers o¤sets the reduction in
retailerssearch e¤ort one-for-one, so the stock of business relationships, nal consumption and
retail prices remain constant.27
These results suggest two conclusions regarding the allocative power of wholesale prices.
First, persistent wholesale price uctuations do retain some signalling power in industries char-
acterized by long-term contracts and e¢ cient bargaining. Yet, this allocative power works
through a di¤erent channel, which depends on the incentives of rms to engage in costly adver-
tising and purchasing activities. For this reason, the e¤ect is considerably delayed and much
more persistent than in the standard monopolistic competition model. Second, the e¤ect of
wholesale price uctuations on retail prices and consumption depends on search externalities.
Search externalities show up whenever the Hosios condition fails to apply, that is, whenever
 < 1   or  > 1  .
5 Product Market Equilibrium in Open Economy
There are, at least, three reasons why our model can have interesting implications for the
dynamics of an industry in open economy. First, border prices are sluggish and their behaviour
reects B2B contracts between exporters and importers (Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008). Second,
exchange rate shocks are the most direct way to test the reaction of prices to shocks, for changes
in the exchange rate are shocks that are truly exogenous to the dynamics of an industry. On
the other hand, the closed economy literature on the pass-through of marginal cost shocks to
prices needs to rely on indirect tests (Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2010). Lastly, since our model
predicts that the allocative power of wholesale prices depends on the search externalities of each
long-term relationship, the application of the model to international trade allows us to examine
the expenditure switching e¤ect of the response of wholesale prices to exchange rate shocks.
According to the standard channel, exchange rate shocks cause expenditure switching that is,
a¤ect consumption in the importing country to the extent that import prices vary and adjust
27See also Figure 6.
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to these shocks.28 In the context of our model, the border prices are the wholesale prices set
through long-term relationships between rms of di¤erent countries, so search and bargaining
frictions can a¤ect the responsiveness of border prices to exchange rate shocks. An interesting
question is thus to determine how important the reaction of wholesale prices to exchange rate
shocks is for expenditure switching.
In what follows, we present an open economy extension of our model, under the standard
assumption that changes in the exchange rate are exogenous to the dynamics of the industry
under analysis. Foreign variables are denoted by a star.
5.1 An Extended Framework
Wholesale rms produce intermediate goods in the home country and sell these goods both in
their own country and in the foreign country. To this end, wholesalers need to enter into long-
term contracts with retailers operating in each market.29 Retailers of a given country transform
intermediate goods into nal goods and sell these goods only to resident consumers. To keep the
analysis simple, we assume that home country wholesalers are specialized in the production of
industry i goods and, consequently, do not face competition from foreign wholesalers. We leave
this interesting extension for future research. Moreover, since there is symmetry between rms,
we continue to save notation and omit rm-specic indexes.
Retailers. The retail sector in the home country is identical to the retail sector of the
closed-economy version of the model. The demand function for the goods produced by this
sector is given by equation (1), and the rst order conditions of its prot maximization problem
are equations (7)  (8).
The foreign retail sector is analogous to the home country retail sector, with the only di¤er-
ence that price variables are denominated in foreign currency. Foreign retailers are an innite
number of rms with unit measure, and the demand function for the consumption goods these
rms produce is:
ct = A
 (pt )
 
28The expenditure switching e¤ect of exchange rate shocks works either through the variability of consumption
goods prices (Friedman, 1953), provided that imports are priced in the currency of the country of the producer
(Devereux and Engel, 2003), or through the variability of intermediate goods prices (Obstfeld, 2001).
29As in Drozd and Nosal (2012), the need to establish B2B relationships with both home and foreign retailers
represents a natural justication for the international segmentation among product markets.
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where pt is the foreign retail price in units of the foreign currency and A is a parameter.30 The
rst-order conditions for the maximization of prots are:
f
kRt
xRt =  (1  ) Jt+1 (14)
Jt = p

t (q

t   !t )  pWtqt +
f
2
(xRt)
2 + (1  )Jt+1 (15)
where the cost parameter f , the marginal value of B2B relationships for a foreign retailer, Jt ,
and the bargained wholesale price of B2B contracts in the foreign country, pWt, are all expressed
in units of the foreign currency.
Wholesalers. Home country wholesalers make deals not only with local retailers, but also
with foreign retailers. The discounted stream of future prots measured in units of the domestic
currency is
E
1X
t=0
t

(pWt  mct) qtTt   
2
(xwt)
2 Tt + (etp

Wt  mct) qt T t  
et
f
2
(xwt)
2 T t

where xwt = at=Tt and xwt = at =T t are the search intensities, respectively, for the home and
foreign markets. et is the nominal exchange rate between the two countries.
The prot maximization problem is constrained by the law of motions for home and foreign
customer bases, which are given by equation (2) and an analogous process for the foreign market.
The rst order condition for the choice of the search intensity and the number of matches in
the local market are the same as in closed economy (equations (3)-(4)). The optimal choices for
transactions with foreign customers are instead as follows:
f
kat
xwt =  (1  )Et
et+1
et
W t+1 (16)
W t =

pWt  
mct
et

qt +
f
2
(xwt)
2 + (1  )Et et+1
et
W t+1 (17)
where W t is the home currency value of a B2B relationship in the foreign country. Note that
both equations are expressed in units of the foreign currency.
30This parameter is a replacement for aggregate consumption, Ct , and the aggregate price level, P

t . C

t and
P t are both exogenous to the industry under analysis, and the standard demand function c

t = (p

t =P

t )
  Ct 
simplies as shown.
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Equation (16) shows that the marginal cost of search in the foreign market (on the left hand
side) must equal the future value of a B2B relationship with foreign retailers. Equation (17)
shows that the current value of customer relationships W t must equal the current and future
benets of getting into these relationships. The exchange rate inuences these benets in two
ways. First, the current exchange rate a¤ects the prot margin of the wholesale sector, acting
as a marginal cost shock with opposite sign. Second, the expected change in the exchange rate
interacts with the future value of B2B relationships, as a reection of the reward needed to
invest in search activities (equation (16)).
5.2 Bargaining and Expenditure-Switching
Home wholesalers and foreign retailers bargain over prices and quantities to maximize the total
surplus in the foreign product market. The solution of this Nash bargaining problem for foreign
wholesale prices and quantities are, respectively,
pWt = 


mct
et
  
Wt

+ (1  )

pt

1  !

t
qt

+
Rt

(18)
pt (q

t   q) = pt  
mct
et
(19)
where  is the bargaining power of foreign retailers and 
Wt =
f
2
(xwt)
2
qt
+ 
f
kat
xwt
qt
and 
Rt =
f
2
(xRt)
2
qt
+ 
f
kRt
xRt
qt
are the savings in the costs of searching for and forming B2B relationships.
According to equation (18), the optimal wholesale price is a weighted average of the valuation
of the intermediate good by home wholesalers and that by foreign retailers rst and second
terms, respectively. This opens the way to pricing to market. Equation (19) suggests that the
marginal cost of adjusting production along the intensive margin (the left hand side) equals the
benet of exchanging one additional unit of the good in the foreign retail market (the total prot
margin on the right hand side).
The nominal exchange rate inuences both the bargained price and the bargained quantity
per match. Equation (19) shows that an exchange rate appreciation a reduction in et leads
to a negative adjustment along the intensive margin. The quantity per match qt falls below
the desired long-run level q, and this decline is more pronounced, the easier for retailers to
absorb the shock by adjusting their production (i.e., the lower  ). In fact, formally, q^t =
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[mc= (ep q)] (p^t   cmct + e^t). Intuitively, the reduction in et raises the foreign currency value of
the marginal costs of producing intermediate goods at home, causing the total surplus generated
by contracts in the foreign market to fall, and so does qt .
This mechanism inuences the response of the wholesale price as well. In fact, from equation
(18), one of the e¤ects of the exchange rate appreciation is that pWt needs to increase as a result
of the marginal increase in the costs mct=et in the wholesale sector. Yet note that, di¤erently
from its e¤ect on qt , the e¤ect of the increase in mct=et on pWt depends forcefully on the
bargaining power of the parties in the contract; specically, on the bargaining power of foreign
retailers . The response of the wholesale price to the exchange rate appreciation is also a
function of the way wholesalers adjust their savings in the costs of search, 
Wt,
31 and on the
change in retailersreservation price through pt and qt . While the e¤ect of the reaction of 
Wt
gets stronger for increasing values of , as it does that of the response of mct=et, the reaction
of retailersvaluation gets progressively smaller.
All in all, since exchange rate shocks a¤ect both the bargained quantity per match qt and
the bargained wholesale price pWt, the exchange rate has expenditure switching e¤ects but
not through the conventional channel. In the model, a shock to the exchange rate a¤ects the
total surplus maximized in a match between home wholesalers and foreign retailers. Working
through the total prot margin pt mct=et, this e¤ect of the shock on the total surplus has direct
implications for qt and foreign consumption, independently of the response of the intermediate
border price pWt. In fact, the quantity per match reacts to the shock, unless the costs of
adjusting production along the intensive margin are extraordinarily high ( is very large). In
this sense, there is a sort of disconnect between the reaction of quantities and that of wholesale
prices. The reaction of qt is not a direct function of the degree of the exchange rate pass-through
(ERPT) to wholesale prices. The ERPT to wholesale prices can change with , but neither 
nor pWt are direct determinants of q

t .
31Optimal bargaining with foreign retailers implies a bargaining rule similar to the one for the home product
market. This is W t = (1  ) Jt . There is however a di¤erence between the two cases. The di¤erence stems
from the fact that the bargaining rule for the foreign market is expressed in foreign currency value terms, as it
is the cost of search at foreign. So, wholesalers need to account for future evolutions in the exchange rate, while
retailers do not. See equations (14)-(16).
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5.3 Quantitative Results
Let the nominal exchange rate be an AR (1) process:
e^t = ee^t 1 + "e;t
where e 2 [0; 1) is the persistence of uctuations in the exchange rate and "e;t is an i.i.d. shock.
Since nominal exchange rates are often close to a unit root, we set e = 0:99 and study the
e¤ects of a decrease in the nominal exchange rate on prices and on search and matching.
In general, prices and quantities are driven by the same key factors a¤ecting the dynamics of
prices and quantity in closed-economy.32 Figure 7 shows the e¤ects of the currency appreciation
on prices and quantity for di¤erent values of the adjustment cost parameter  . In particular,
the rst two diagrams measure the pass-through to prices on impact (left graph) and after one
year (right graph). The remaining four diagrams show the responses of variables concerning the
extensive and intensive margins of adjustment.
Regardless of the size of the adjustment costs, the ERPT to retail prices is systematically
lower than the ERPT to wholesale prices. This is consistent with the large set of empirical
ndings reviewed by Burstein and Gopinath (2013). Moreover, for intermediate values of  
(i.e., for  = 1), exchange rate shocks have a rather limited impact e¤ect on prices. The e¤ect
of the shock grows larger twelve months after its occurrence, yet the ERPT remains incomplete:
it is around 60 percent, for retail prices, and around 75 percent, for wholesale prices. This is
due to the fact that home wholesalers and foreign retailers react to the currency appreciation
adjusting along both the intensive margin and the extensive margin. The adjustment of qt along
the intensive margin is due to the increase in the foreign currency value of the marginal costs
of intermediate goods production. The adjustment of pWt along the extensive margin is due
to both this reaction of the marginal costs and the e¤ect of the shock on the search e¤ort by
wholesalers, which in fact falls alongside the number of B2B relationships established in the
foreign country. For smaller adjustment costs (i.e., for  ! 0), there is a sounder decline in
32For the sake of brevity, we do not discuss how the persistence of the shock a¤ects the industry dynamics under
exchange rate shocks and keep the analysis centered around aspects relevant for the expenditure switching e¤ect
of such shocks. Nonetheless, we have found that the persistence of exchange rate shocks is important mostly for
the incentives of rms to engage in B2B relationships across the border.
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the quantity per match, a larger degree of ERPT to prices, and correspondingly less need to
reduce the number of B2B relationships in place. The reverse is true for industries where foreign
retailers nd it very hard to adjust their production (i.e., for  = 100000), in which case the
ERPT is rather limited.
Figure 8 shows the e¤ects of the currency appreciation for various assumptions about the
bargaining power of foreign retailers . The currency appreciation acts as a negative stimulus
for both the quantity traded within each match and the formation of new B2B relationships.
The degree of pass-through to wholesale prices depends markedly on the value assumed by ,
but  has limited e¤ects on both retail prices and consumption. The pass-through to pWt is
increasing in , both on impact and after 12 months. But the increase in the pass-through to
pWt has weak consequences for the real side of trade. The response of the quantity per match
to the appreciation is almost independent of the bargaining power of the rms. This has a
slightly larger e¤ect on the extensive margin of trade, for the e¢ ciency of the matches in the
international product market is a function of . Overall, the responses of B2B relationships, of
retail prices and of nal consumption reach a maximum when  = 0:5 i.e., when the Hosios
condition holds and decrease symmetrically as we move away from this value.
Interestingly, this conrms that there is a sort of disconnect between the ERPT to the
price of imported intermediate goods and nal consumption. When foreign retailersbargaining
power goes from 0:5 towards 1, the increase in the ERPT to wholesale prices is associated with
a reduction in the ERPT to retail prices and in expenditure switching. In this sense, Figure
8 provides a visual indication of the fact that the expenditure switching e¤ect of the exchange
rate appreciation is not necessarily either captured or triggered by a change in import prices. It
rather depends on the costs of adjusting production along the intensive and extensive margins.
Robustness. We have made the assumption that home wholesalers and foreign retailers
bargain over pWt, which is denominated in foreign currency. This assumption is, for instance, in
line with the fact that U.S. imports are priced in dollars (Gopinath and Rigobon, 2008) and that
large transactions are likely to be invoiced in the importerscurrency (Goldberg and Tille, 2009).
However, as it is simple to see, the results do not depend on the currency of denomination of the
wholesale price. Specically, the results would not change if we assumed that rms bargained
over a price denominated in home currency. This is because what the alternative assumption
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implies is a change in the currency of denomination of rmsprots and hence of the optimal
sharing rule of the Nash-bargaining problem. While equation (18) is the optimal solution of
a sharing rule expressed in units of the foreign currency, under the alternative assumption the
bargained price is the solution of a sharing rule denominated in the home currency. We have
in fact checked that, converted back into foreign currency, the latter solution is equivalent to
equation (18).
6 Conclusion
This paper has developed a simple model of pricing in the context of business relationships
between wholesalers and retailers in the product market. This characterization of the product
market is in line with a number of recent studies emphasizing that rms need to establish
long-term relationships to expand trade. The search frictions that a¤ect the adjustment of the
customer base to shocks are thus key to the behaviour of prices.
We have specically distinguished between intensive and extensive margins of adjustment.
We have found that the intensive margin of adjustment depends mostly on how costly is for
retailers to transform wholesale goods into nal goods. The convenience to invest in new B2B
relationships along the extensive margin is instead a function of the persistence of shocks. We
have analyzed how these two sources of adjustment interplay and found that this interaction
a¤ects the pass-through of exchange rate and other cost shocks to prices. The pass-through tends
to be low under various parametrizations and is almost always incomplete. One of the main
drivers of the pass-through is the bargaining power of retailers, which can limit the allocative
power of wholesale prices, in closed economy, and can restrain the expenditure switching e¤ect of
exchange rate shocks, in closed economy. But we have found that in none of these two cases the
pass-through of cost shocks to wholesale prices is informative of how wholesalers and retailers
agree to adjust trade after a cost shock. In this sense, our results suggests that, when it comes
to industries where bargaining and long-term relationships are the rule, it could be misleading
to use the ERPT as the sole metric of the expenditure switching e¤ect of exchange rate shocks.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Following Hosios (1990), the constrained e¢ cient allocation is the solution to the problem of
a benevolent social planner, who is subject to the same technological constraints and search
frictions that rms confront in a decentralized equilibrium. The idea is that the social planner
cannot circumvent the search frictions, but she can internalize the e¤ect of changes in product
market tightness on the costs of search and on the resource constraint.
The maximization problem of the social planner is
max
fyt;qt;Tt;at;dtg
E0
1X
t=0
t
n
ptyt  mctqtTt   
2
x2RtTt  

2
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o
(20)
subject to the technological constraints on the extensive margin (matching frictions) and inten-
sive margin (adjustment costs):
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Equation (20) is based on the fact that, due symmetry in preferences and technology, e¢ ciency
requires that identical quantities of each good be produced by each wholesaler and each retailer.
The rst order conditions are:
pt (qt   q) = pt  mct (21)
 t = pt
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where  t is the social value of a match at the margin. To compare the social planners optimality
conditions with those of the decentralized equilibrium, let us rewrite the latter as follows:
pt (qt   q) = pt  mct (25)
 t = pt
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where  t = Wt + Jt. It is now easy to see that 1   =  is a necessary and su¢ cient condition
for the constrained e¢ cient solution (21)   (24) to be equivalent to the decentralized solution
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(25)  (28). 
B Proof of Proposition 2
When it is purely transitory, a marginal cost shock has no e¤ect on the expected future value
of a business relationship (EtW^t+1 = EtJ^t+1 = 0). Consequently, wholesalers and retailers have
no incentive to adjust their search intensities to the shock: x^wt = EtW^t+1 = x^Rt = EtJ^t+1 = 0.
The problem becomes static because, with search e¤orts being constant, also the number of B2B
relationships remains unchanged.
From the log-linearization of the market clearing condition,  p^t = y^t, follows:
p^t =   1


T^t + q^t

=  

q^t (29)
where  = qq ! (1   (q   q)) captures the curvature of the production function of retailers with
respect to q^t. Plugging (29) into the log-linearization of (11) yields:
q^t =
1
 
mc
pq
(p^t   cmct) =  Bq (cmct) (30)
where Bq =
q
1+

q
captures the elasticity of q^t to changes in the total prot margin, and
q =
1
 totq is a decreasing function of  . Using equation (30) back into (29), we get
p^t =


Bq (cmct) (31)
where Bq is decreasing in both  and .
Combining (30) and (31) with the log-linearization of (10), we nally obtain:
p^Wt =


mc
pW
+ (1  ) p (q   !)
pW q


Bq +AqBq
 cmct
where Aq captures the elasticity of the wholesale price to changes in q^t, and is a decreasing
function of  . 
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Parameter E¤ect on Variables
T q  p pW R W 
tot
Adjustment Cost ( )
100000 0.551 1.000 1.000 1.105 1.052 1.050 1.052 1.105
1 0.519 1.091 1.000 1.100 1.048 1.050 1.048 1.100
0:00001 0.007 144.50 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.001 1.000 1.001
Bargaining Power ()
0:1 0.358 1.140 3.000 1.163 1.138 1.022 1.138 1.163
0:5 0.519 1.091 1.000 1.100 1.048 1.050 1.048 1.100
0:9 0.358 1.140 0.333 1.163 1.015 1.145 1.015 1.163
Table 1: Sensitivity of the Steady State to Adjustment Costs and Bargaining Power of Firms.
Note: The sensitivity analysis is conducted keeping  xed to its calibrated value of 0.3457 and
letting the adjustment cost  and the bargaining power  vary, each one at a time. Wholesalers
and retailersmarkups are dened, respectively, as W  pW =mc and R  p=pW .
Month mct Reaction of Variables
pWt Wt pt Rt qt Tt at
0 1 0.57 -0.43 0.11 -0.46 -0.74 0 -1.27
3 0.5 0.30 -0.20 0.10 -0.21 -0.34 -0.28 -0.67
6 0.25 0.17 -0.08 0.08 -0.09 -0.14 -0.35 -0.36
9 0.125 0.10 -0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.33 -0.19
Table 2: Persistent Marginal Cost Shock and Pass-Through. Note: The variables react to a
unit increase in marginal costs, which is mildly persistent:  = 0:5
1
3 . Wholesalers and retailers
markups are dened, respectively, as W  pW =mc and R  p=pW .
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Figure 1: Marginal Cost Shock: Persistence of the Shock. Note: The shock is a one unit increase
in marginal costs. All of the parameters assume their baseline values, except for the persistence
of the shock .
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Figure 2: Persistent Marginal Cost Shock: Intensive Margin of Adjustment. Note: The shock is
a one unit increase in marginal costs. For each adjustment cost  , the persistence of the shock
is set to  = 0:95.
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Figure 3: Bargaining Power of Firms and Pass-Through. Note: The pass-through is the e¤ect
of marginal cost shocks on prices for various values of the bargaining power . For each , the
persistence of the shock is set to  = 0:95.
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Figure 4: Persistent Marginal Cost Shock: Bargaining Power of Firms. Note: The shock is a
one unit increase in marginal costs. For each bargaining power , the persistence of the shock
is set to  = 0:95.
39
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
p
retail price
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
pw
wholesale price
0 5 10 15 20
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
month
yi
consumption
0 5 10 15 20
-2
-1
0
1
2
p
retail price
0 5 10 15 20
0
0.5
1
1.5
pw
wholesale price
0 5 10 15 20
-10
-5
0
5
10
month
yi
consumption
A. eta=0.1
B. eta=0.5
C. eta=0.9
A) Mon. Competition Model B) B2B Model
Figure 5: Allocative Power of Wholesale Prices: Monopolistic Competition vs. B2B. Note: The
shock is an increase in the wholesale price pWt caused by a one unit decrease in the bargaining
power . The persistence of the shock is set to  = 0:95. For the B2B model, we consider three
initial values of .
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Figure 6: Persistent Wholesale Price Shock in the B2B Model. Note: The shock is an increase
in the wholesale price pWt caused by a one unit decrease in the bargaining power . For each
initial value of , the persistence of the shock is set to  = 0:95.
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Figure 7: Persistent Currency Appreciation: Pass-Through and Intensive Margin in the Foreign
Country. Note: The shock is a one unit decrease in the nominal exchange rate. For each
adjustment cost  , the persistence of the shock is set to e = 0:99:
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Figure 8: Persistent Currency Appreciation: Pass-Through and Bargaining Power of Foreign
Retailers. Note: The shock is a one unit decrease in the nominal exchange rate. For each
bargaining power of foreign retailers , the persistence of the shock is set to e = 0:99.
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